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Literature has shown that organizational capital is an important production factor and is positively 
related to firm value, Tobin’s Q, stock returns and executive compensation. We examine whether 
this organizational capital functions well in another firm in a merger. Results show that acquirers 
experience higher announcement abnormal returns when the targets have higher organizational 
capital and this effect strengthens in non-diversifying acquisitions and when acquirers have better 
corporate governance. 
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Organizational capital, a kind of intangible capital, has been drawing more researchers’ attention 
in recent years. It was first defined by Prescott & Visscher (1980) as an information asset, for 
instance, personnel information, team information and firm-specific human capital, which affects 
companies’ production possibility set. Organizational capital matters because working efficiency 
of a worker on a particular job depends on whether the worker matches the job and is also related 
to the attitude of the worker towards the teammates. Lev (2001) groups intangible capital into four 
categories, which include discovery/learning intangibles, customer-related intangibles, human-
resource intangibles and organizational capital. Then Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) and Lev, 
Radhakrishnan and Zhang (2009) further define organizational capital as “the agglomeration of 
business processes and systems, as well as a unique corporate culture, that enables them to convert 
factors of production into output more efficiently”. Most common examples of organizational 
capital are the unique business models owned by firms. For instance, Walmart supply chain system 
allows the suppliers to know which goods are bought by customers when the goods are checked 
out at the store counters, which makes it a lot more efficient for inventory management. Even being 
familiar with firm’s computer system or knowing whom to ask when problems arise are also 
considered as part of the organizational capital, because it helps the company to function more 
efficiently. One more anecdotal example is: Facebook CEO Mark Zuckergberg does not have his 
own private office. He is more approachable by sharing the same office with his co-workers. This 
obviously promotes communications and creates an easier and more relaxing working atmosphere, 
thus improving efficiency. So in one sentence, organizational capital is all the knowledge, 
information, conventions used to “combine human skills and physical capital into systems for 
producing and delivering want-satisfying products” (Westphal (1995, p.2237)).  
Literature divides into two groups in terms of whether organization capital is embodied in workers 
and in their match with different tasks, or embodied in the organization itself, which means 
“organizational capital is a firm-specific capital good jointly produced with output” (Atkeson and 
Kehoe 2002). For the former view, Jovanovic (1979), Prescott and Visscher (1980), Becker (1993), 
Jovanovic and Moffit (1990) and Topel (1991) have developed explicit microeconomic models and 
measured different aspects of this firm-specific human capital. For the latter statement, Arrow 
(1962), Rosen (1972) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) view organizational capital as acquired by 
endogenous learning-by-doing. In this present study, we follow Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
2 
 
who propose that organizational capital is partly embodied in employees (key talents) and partly 
firm specific, because key talents (executives, experts, white collars, etc.) are the people to design, 
carry out and implement the special processes and systems. 
The crucial difference between organizational capital and physical capital is that the productivity 
and output claiming of organizational capital are highly related with key talents. Since 
organizational capital is embodied within key employees, both key employees and shareholders 
have a claim on the cash flows created from it, which is different with physical capital (all cash 
flows go to shareholders). Thus the benefit from organizational capital to shareholders is somehow 
dependent on the division of gains from organizational capital between shareholders and key 
employees, which adds more risk to shareholders. At the same time, firms are facing a loss of key 
talents (losing organizational capital). From the two aspects above, organizational capital is riskier 
than physical capital to shareholders. Another characteristic of organizational capital is that its 
efficiency is partly firm specific, because the skills and training obtained from one firm might be 
useful but not necessarily useful to another firm. Even if it’s useful to another firm, it’s productivity 
in a new firm depends on how the key talents perform in the new firm with the new environment.  
As for the comparison between human capital and organizational capital, they are similar in that 
they are both intangible, employee related and hard to measure. And from theory, human capital is 
the part of knowledge, skills and know-how people acquire either from education or from job 
training, which is applicable to any work and company, while organizational capital is the part of 
“human capital” (embodied in employees) which is firm specific and matters to organizational 
relationships, thus it might not work in other firms. However, in practice, human capital and 
organizational capital can be barely separated and measured. 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) propose a model to explain the physical capital reallocation 
through acquisitions, when there is a technology shock, based on which, Faria (2008) develops an 
equilibrium model in which bidders acquire targets in order to get their organizational capital, when 
organizational capital is attained cheaper from externally. On the other hand, when the long run 
benefit of organizational capital is lower than the benefit from selling it, firms would like to be 
acquired.  
Based on the discussion above, we may wonder whether acquirers can benefit from targets’ high 
organizational capital. We propose our research question, does organizational capital have an effect 
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on the acquirers’ abnormal returns in a merger and acquisition? Although Li, Qiu and Shen (2016) 
find that acquirers with higher organizational capital experience higher post-merger abnormal 
returns, whether targets’ organizational capital stock has an effect on acquirers’ returns is still 
questionable from the literature. On the one hand, organizational capital is a key production factor, 
and it’s potentially transferrable through the moving of key talents or acquisition, thus the acquirers 
might benefit from targets’ organizational capital. On the other hand, as argued in Lev and 
Radhakrishnan (2005), “organizational capital is predominately tacit and difficult to transfer across 
firms, and hence of questionable value in acquisitions”. The literature fails to answer the question 
whether organizational capital is transferrable among firms and thus also fails to provide a definite 
direction on organizational capital’s effect on M&A returns, this is an empirical question. 
Accordingly, we ask: does targets’ organizational capital affect acquirers’ announcement abnormal 
returns? If yes, what is the direction of such effect? What factors influence the functioning of 
organizational capital in the new firm?  
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it finds another important factor to 
explain acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns. Second, it offers a more definitive answer to 
the questions: whether firms can buy organizational capital (whether organizational capital is 
transferrable). Then we investigate which factors affect the utilization of organizational capital in 
another firm. The results show that targets’ organizational capital’s positive effect on acquirers’ 
announcement returns strengthens when the two parties are from the same industry and when the 
acquirers have better corporate governance.  
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and our 
hypotheses. Section 3 illustrates our sample construction, testing model and variable selections. 
We present our empirical results and robustness tests in Section 4. Later on, we examine whether 
diversification and corporate governance matter in the utilizing of targets’ organizational capital in 




2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Literature Review 
There is a growing interest in the function of intellectual capital, and many papers have investigated 
how organizational capital is related with firms’ output and growth, firm valuation, CEO 
compensation, firm innovation and M&A returns. 
2.1.1 Organizational Capital and Output 
Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) build a quantitative model (based on industry evolution models) to 
estimate the growth of plant’s life cycle and use it to measure the overall size of payments to plants 
owners. The result is that payments from organization capital are more than one-third of the 
payments from physical capital.  Through the Cobb-Douglas production function model with inputs 
including physical, brand, labor, R&D and organizational capital, De and Dutta (2007) and 
Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) find that organizational capital and labor have the highest output 
elasticities and the output elasticity of organizational capital is higher for non-R&D firms. 
2.1.2. Organizational Capital and Equity Valuation and Stock Returns 
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) argue that because of its uniqueness, organizational capital is 
difficult to be copied by competitors, thus able to produce abnormal returns. They estimate 
organizational capital by cumulating SG&A and find that it contributes significantly to the 
explanation of firms’ equity valuation (the contribution is larger and more significant than residual 
earning). Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) investigate the effect of organization capital on the 
cross-sectional expected returns. Their model shows that organizational capital makes firms riskier 
and raises discount rates by about 4.5 percent and that “firms with higher organizational capital are 
more productive, smaller, have higher Tobin’s Q. 
2.1.3. Organizational Capital and CEO Compensation and Employee Turnover 
Based on the previous study, Lev, Radhakrishnan and Zhang (2009) further find that organizational 
capital is consistent with firms’ operating performance and positively relates to CEO compensation.  
Lustig, Syverson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) investigate the division of the cash flow created 
by organizational capital, between managers and shareholders and find that organizational capital 
helps to explain the variability in CEO compensation. Carlin, Chowdhry and Garmaise (2012) take 
organization capital as a form of intrafirm language and that firms with higher organizational 
capital experience lower turnover, which implies that firms with high organizational capital are 
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more likely to promote senior managers from within the firm. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) 
also find that firms with higher organizational capital have higher levels of executive compensation. 
2.1.4. Organizational Capital and M&As 
Li, Qiu and Shen (2016) find that acquirers with high organizational capital are more likely to 
acquire firms with high organizational capital and they experience higher post-merger abnormal 
returns, cut more on the cost of goods sold, achieve greater asset turnover and innovative efficiency. 
Faria (2008) proposes that a merger may arise when there is a gain to trade organizational capital 
(when the cost of external acquisition of organizational capital is lower than the cost of internally 
developing it). He uses a dynamic matching model to testify that mergers are an equilibrium 
outcome for acquirers to get access to targets’ organizational capital. The closest paper to ours is 
Li, Qiu and Shen (2016), which is also interested in the effect of organizational capital in an 
acquisition, but more focused on acquirers’ organizational capital. They find that acquirers with 
high organizational capital are more likely to acquire firms with high organizational capital and 
they experience higher post-merger abnormal returns. 
2.1.5. Others  
Evenson and Westphal (1995) state that organizational capital is related to firms’ operating abilities, 
investing abilities and innovation abilities. Youndt, Subramaniam and Snell (2004) are interested 
in the relation of the three forms of intellectual capital. They propose that human, social capital and 
organizational capital are not completely independent and find that “only a small proportion of the 
firms which are superior performing have high levels of all the three types of intellectual capital 
and also a small proportion of the firms which are underperforming have very low levels of all the 
three intellectual forms and most of the firms are high in levels in only one subcategory”. Liu, Mao 
and Tian (2016) investigate whether individuals’ human capital or firms’ organizational capital 
matter in terms of innovation. They find that human capital is much more important regarding 
patent counts and citations, while human capital and organizational capital are “about the same as 
important when explaining the firm’s innovation styles in terms of patent exploratory and 
exploitive scores”. 
2.2.  Hypotheses Development 
As defined in the introduction, organizational capital’s tacitness and uniqueness make it hard to be 
mimicked by competitors, thus yielding abnormal returns. And its “partly embodied in key 
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employees” characteristic makes it possibly transferrable in a merger. So our first hypothesis is 
developed as following: 
H1: Acquirers’ announcement cumulative abnormal returns are positively related with targets’ 
organizational capital stock. 
The alternative hypothesis of hypothesis one is that the targets’ organizational capital has either no 
or even a negative effect on the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return, because of the risky nature 
of organizational capital. First, as argued in the introduction, the cash flow to shareholders from 
organizational capital depends on the division between shareholders and key talents, which exposes 
shareholders to more risks. Second, firms are always facing a loss of key employees, thus losing 
organizational capital. This risk depends on the key talents’ “outside option”. The risk of losing 
key talents increases when acquisitions happen, especially in a hostile takeover, in which the targets’ 
management team is more possible to be replaced. Third, acquirers may not able to utilize targets’ 
organizational capital very well, because of organizational capital’s firm specificness or the 
acquirers’ management. So the effect of organizational capital on acquirers’ abnormal returns is 
not certain in theory. 
Because organizational capital is partly firm specific, we may wonder what factors help the 
acquirer make better use of it. If the acquirer and target are in the same industry, which means they 
have similar business, products, processes and operating systems, it would be easier and more 
possible for the acquirer to fully utilize the targets’ organizational capital. Our second hypothesis 
is: 
H2: Organizational capital’s positive effect on acquirers’ abnormal returns is more significant 
in non-diversifying acquisitions. 
As we have discussed, part of organizational capital’s riskiness comes from the uncertainty of the 
division of the output from it between shareholders and key talents. But what if the acquirers have 
a better or clearer way of dealing with the conflict? Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) document 
that firms with stronger corporate governance have less agency problems and the CEOs receive 
lower compensations. When the targets are taken by the acquirers, the acquirers’ good corporate 
governance helps address the agency problem created by organizational capital (cash flow division 
between key talents and shareholders), thus increasing stock returns. 
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On the other hand, Gompers, lshii and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004), and 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that firms with better corporate governance (stronger shareholder 
rights) have higher firm value. Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) also document the 
positive relation between corporate governance and expected stock returns. It’s reasonable to 
assume that a larger synergy will be created when firms are acquired by better corporate governance.  
So we propose that organizational capital’s positive effect will be strengthened by stronger 
corporate governance, by reducing agency problem.  
H3: Organizational capital’s positive effect on acquirers’ abnormal returns is more significant 
when acquirers have better corporate governance.
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3. Data Description 
3.1.  Data Selection 
We use merger and acquisitions announced between January 1984 to December 2013 available on 
Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. domestic database. We get 1654 acquisitions made by 
U.S. bidders of U.S. targets, which meet the following criteria: 
(1) The transaction is completed. 
(2) The bidder controls less than 50% of the targets’ shares before the announcement and 
acquires 100% of the targets’ shares after the transaction. 
(3) The deal value is greater than $1 million. 
(4) The acquirer and target are public firms listed on the University of Chicago’s Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT during the event window. 
(5) Deal value is more than 1% of acquirers’ market value. The market value of the acquirer 
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, 
and the liquidating value of preferred stock. 
(6) Financial firms (primary SIC code between 6000 and 6999) are discarded. 
(7) Acquirers’ post merger cumulative abnormal return (CAR) based on a window of 11 
days surrounding announcement day is available on Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDs) Event Study. 
(8) There is no missing values for key control variables used in the regression analysis. 
Our sample selection criteria are similar to Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), except that 
we get CAR from WRDs Event Study database. 
3.2.  Dependent Variable 
Acquirers’ announcement CARs are obtained from WRDs Event Study, which are estimated from 
market model. 
AR=R-E(R)=R-(Rf+α+β(Rm-Rf))                                         (1) 
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Estimation window is from day -210 (210th day prior to announcement day) to day -11 (11th day 
prior to announcement day). Event window is (-5, +5). Minimum of value number of returns is 100. 
We denote this CAR as CAR11. 
3.3.  Test Variable 
Targets’ organizational capital is our key test variable. We follow the method of Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), measuring organizational capital by cumulating SG&A expenses using 








                                                              (3) 
Whereas OCt is the organizational capital in year t, SGAt is the SG&A expenses in year t and CPIt 
is the consumer price index in year t. δo is depreciation rate of SG&A, and g is growth rate of 
SG&A. Exactly following Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou (2013), we choose g as 10% and δo as 15%. 
SG&A expenses data is from COMPUSTAT and OC is scaled by asset and adjusted for industry 
level (less median of firms in the same industry).  
To address the concern that some of the SG&A expenses cannot be seen as organizational capital, 
Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou (2013) offers 4 validations to this method. They find empirical evidence 
of the effectiveness of this method from 10-K filings, managerial quality surveys, investment in 
information technology and Firm Profitability. 
3.4.  Firm and Deal Characteristics 
We select our control variables base on Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Masulis Wang 
and Xie (2007). Firm level characteristics include both acquirers’ and targets’ sizes, leverages, 
market to book value (mtob) and returns on assets (ROAs), all of which are measured at the end of 
firms’ fiscal year prior to announcement date. Moeller, Schligemann and Stulz (2004) find that 
small acquirers have about two percentage points higher announcement returns, though Wright, 
Kroll and Elenkov (2002) find that acquisition returns increase in firm size. We use natural log of 
asset as proxy for firm size. Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) find that acquirers with 
higher leverage have higher announcement returns, though Moeller, Schligemann and Stulz (2004) 
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don’t show leverage effect on acquisition returns. We define leverage as long term debt plus debt 
in current liabilities divided by asset. Servaes (1991) finds that acquirers’ return is positive related 
with acquirers’ Tobin’s q and negatively related with targets’ Tobin’s q while Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1989) and Moeller, Schligemann and Stulz (2004) find that acquirers’ Tobin’s q has a 
negative effect on its abnormal returns. We expect that a higher synergy will be created if the 
acquirer or target has a higher ROA, since ROA is a proxy for firm’s profitability, which reflects 
managerial ability. ROA is defined as EBIT divided by total asset.  
Deal characteristics include relative deal value, attitude and payment method of the acquisition， 
whether the acquisition is a tender offer and whether it is a diversifying merger. Evidence is found 
in Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) that relative size of the two parts contributes to explain 
acquirer announcement returns. We use the ratio of deal value to acquirers’ market value as a proxy 
for relative size. Market value is defined as the sum of value of equity, long term debt, debt in 
current liabilities and the liquidating value of preferred stock. As for the attitude of acquisition, it’s 
reasonable to assume that the acquirer benefit more in a friendly takeover and less in a hostile 
takeover. This is especially important when we think of the utilization of targets’ organizational 
capital. In a hostile acquisition, targets’ management team might be replaced which would lead to 
a loss of organizational capital. We expect that higher acquirer abnormal returns are attained 
through cash payment, because equity payment signals to the market that acquirers’ stock is 
overvalued. Though this signal has nothing to do with the synergy effect of the acquisition, 
acquirers’ information is picked up by the market through the payment method, which negatively 
affects acquirers’ post-merger returns. This is confirmed by many papers such as Wansley, Lane 
and Yang (1983), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009).  
We know that the closer the acquirers’ and targets’ businesses are, the more synergy effect the 
merger creates. Both Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) 
find that acquirers of non-diversifying acquisitions benefit more in terms of announcement 
abnormal returns. Based on this, we ask, do acquirers benefit more from targets’ organizational 
capital if they are in the same industry? So we include “diversifying” as a control variable in our 
model. If the acquirers and targets are from the same industry, following Fama and French (1988), 
the acquisition is considered as non-diversifying.  
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After constructing all the test and control variables and deleting all the missing values, we get a 
sample consisting of 1654 mergers.  
[Insert Table B.1 here] 
Table B.1 presents the sample distribution by announcement year. Year 1984 has the lowest 
number (10) of acquisitions in our sample. Starting from 1989, the number of acquisitions 
decreases and reaches to 22 in 1992, from when it starts increasing significantly in the following 
years until it reaches its peak in 1998. Year 1997, 1998 and 1999 have the most acquisitions, 
consisting 22% of our total sample. Then the number of acquisitions steadily decreases to 25 in 
2013. Table B.1 also reports the means of acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns (CAR11) and 
targets’ organizational capital prior to announcement in each year. The lowest mean CAR11 
happens in 1991 (-0.0485), which is consistent with the recession in early 1990s. And highest mean 
CAR11 appears in 2013 (0.0380). The average target organizational capital is 0.2744.  
[Insert Table B.2 here] 
Table B.2 shows all the variables’ statistic properties of our sample. The mean of the dependent 
variable CAR11 is around negative 2% and the average organizational capital for all the target 
companies is 0.27 with a standard deviation of 1.38. For comparison, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013) report a mean of organizational capital as 0.27 for its low organizational quintile and 2.71 
for its high organizational capital quintile, while Li, Qiu and Shen (2016) document the mean of 
acquirers’ organizational capital of 0.97, with a standard deviation of 1.05. Difference might come 
from the size of the firms, since Li Qiu and Shen (2016) focused on acquirers’ organizational capital 
which are usually a lot larger than targets. 
Before making acquisitions, the acquirers have an average ROA of 9%, which is a lot higher than 
the targets’ (4%). The market to book means of acquirers and targets are 3.71 and 3.08. And they 
have a leverage mean of 0.22 and 0.21 respectively. Forty-nine percentage of our target companies 
are considered as companies with high level of organizational capital (higher than sample median). 
And the proportions for hostile takeovers, all-cash payment mergers and tender offer mergers are 
3%, 44% and 30% respectively.  
Then we examine the correlations among the independent variables, results of which are shown in 
Table B.3. Multicollinearity is not a concern for our sample. We noticed that the correlations 
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between firm size and OC for both acquirers and targets are negative (-0.19 and -0.25). Since our 
OC is size adjusted (scaled by book assets), this results mean, smaller firms tend to have higher 
proportion of organizational capital stock, which is consistent with the finding of Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013). Another interesting finding is the correlations between OC and ROA, which 
is also negative for both of the acquirers and targets. This is contradictive with the finding of 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), who document a positive relationship between organizational 
capital and firm profitability. But Li, Qiu and Shen (2016) also document these same negative 
correlations in their sample. 




4.1.  Univariate Test 
We employ an univariate test by sorting the sample into 2 groups based on targets’ organizational 
capital and comparing the CAR11s for the 2 subsamples. Results are shown in Table B.4.  
[Insert Table B.4 here] 
A firm is classified as a high organizational capital firm if its OC is no smaller than -0.0221 (sample 
median). 810 target firms are classified as high organizational group, while 844 target firms are 
recognized as low organizational firms. The CAR11 mean for the high organizational capital group 
(High OC) is -0.83% while the CAR11 mean for the low organizational capital group (Low OC) is 
-2.56% which is a lot smaller than the high group, economically. The t value for the difference of 
the two CAR11s is 3.3, which shows that the two means are statistically significant. The univariate 
test result shows us that acquirers experience higher post-merger abnormal returns when the targets 
have a higher organizational capital. 
4.2.  Main Regression 
Now we move on to formally test the effect of targets’ organizational capital on the acquisition 
announcement abnormal returns of the acquirer using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
The model is as following: 
CAR11=b0+b1OC+b2size+b3mtob+b4leverage+b5roa+b6sizetarget+b7mtobtarget+b8leveragetarget 
                    +b9roatarget+b10relative dealvalue+b11hostile+b12allcash+b13tender offer+b14diversifying 
                                                                                                                                                         (4) 
Whereas OC is the key variable we are testing, size, mtob,  leverage  and roa  are acquirers’ 
characteristics. sizetarget, mtobtarget,  leveragetarget  and roatarget are targets’ characteristics, while the 
rest of the independent variables are deal characteristics. We control for industry effect and year 
effect and acquirer cluster in the regression. Results are shown in Table B.5. 
[Insert Table B.5 here] 
We control for fixed industry effect and year effect and use acquirer cluster in our regression. 
Column (1) is the regression results using continuous OC data and column (2) is the results using 
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OC as a dummy variable. From Table B.5, both coefficients continuous OC variable and dummy 
OC variable are significantly positive, which means targets’ organizational capital has a positive 
effect on acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns. To be specific, the average of acquirers’ 
announcement abnormal returns is about 0.055% higher if the average of targets’ organizational 
capital is 10 percentage points higher. And the high OC group experience 1.38% higher 
announcement abnormal returns than the low OC group, on average.  
As for the control variables, most of our results are consistent with the literature except “acquirer 
size” and “relative dealvalue”, but they make sense taking the properties of organizational capital 
into account. According to Moeller, Schligemann and Stulz (2004), small acquirers outperform 
large acquirers in terms of announcement returns, although Wright, Kroll and Elenkov (2002) find 
that acquisition returns increase in firm size. Our result is consistent with the latter, although both 
acquirer size and relative dealvalue are insignificant. The explanation is that larger acquirers might 
be able to take more advantage of and utilize targets’ organizational capital, thus gaining a higher 
return. It’s the same case with the “relative dealvalue” variable.  
4.3. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we test whether our results keep the same using other acquirer abnormal return 
proxies. First, we use CAR3 and CAR5 as dependent variables. CAR3 denotes CAR (-1, +1), which 
stands for 3-days cumulative abnormal returns (from 1 day before the event day to 1 day after the 
event day). CAR5 is CAR (-2, +2), which stands for 5-days cumulative abnormal returns (from 2 
days before the event day to 2 days after the event day). Estimation windows are from day -205 to 
day -6, and from day -210 to day -8, respectively following Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) 
and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). Same with CAR11, both CAR3 and CAR5 are attained directly 
from WRDs Event Study. Results are shown in Table B.6, from which we see that both continuous 
OC variable and dummy OC variable are significantly positive, except CAR3 with continuous OC. 
One interesting observation is that the adjusted R-squared increase, using CAR3 and CAR5. 
[Insert Table B.6 here] 
Then we use buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR3, BHAR5 and BHAR11) to do the robustness 
test, the conclusions stay the same. All of the regressions except BHAR3 with continuous OC are 
significant. Adjusted R-squared increase, compared with the main regression. Results are presented 
in Table B.7.  
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[Insert Table B.7 here] 
Further, we also perform a robustness test on the depreciation rate of OC.   The results show that 
our results stay significant for  𝛿 between 5% and 40%.  The results are shown in Table B.8. 
[Insert Table B.8 here] 
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5. Does Diversifying Merger Matter? 
In order to test hypothesis 2, we classify the samples based on whether they are diversifying acquisitions 
or non-diversifying acquisitions. There are 558 diversifying mergers and 1143 non-diversifying mergers 
in our sample. The results are shown in Table B.9. The OC coefficients are small and non-significant in 
the diversifying mergers, which means, acquirers cannot benefit from targets’ organizational capital if 
they operate in two industries, while the effect of organizational capital is significant under 90% 
significance level. But the interesting point is the t value of the non-diversifying subsample is smaller 
than the results in the full sample, which is contra-intuitive. But this might result from the smaller 
sample size. The adjusted R-squared also increase in the non-diversifying sample.  
[Insert Table B.9 here] 
On the other hand, we also test this hypothesis by adding an interaction variable of “diversifying” and 
“OC” to the main regression. We call this interaction variable “diversify_oc”, which stands for the effect 
of “diversifying” on the effect of “OC”. However, the results don’t show any significance of this 
variable (t values are 0.232 and 0.522 for two regressions), which are shown in Table B.10. 
 [Insert Table B.10 here] 










6. Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
Following Gompers, Metrick and Ishii (2003), Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), Wang and Xie (2009) 
and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), we use total institutional ownership, G-index and E-index 
as proxies for corporate governance. And test whether the positive effect of targets’ organizational 
capital defers in stronger and weaker acquirer corporate governance. Results are shown in Table 
B.11 to Table B.13. In table B.11, “High_ownership” is the sample of firms with higher 
institutional ownership, which means higher shareholder rights and better corporate governance. 
The OC coefficient for “High_ownership” is 0.0079 with a t value of 2.689, a lot higher than the 
ones in main regression, while the OC coefficient for “Low_ownership” subsample is 0.0044 with 
a t value of 1.165. In tables B.12 and B.13, “Low_Gindex” and “Low_Eindex” are the subsamples 
with better corporate governance. All 3 tables show that organizational capital’s positive effect on 
acquirers’ abnormal returns is more significant both economically and statistically, when acquirers 
have better corporate governance. 
[Insert Table B.11 here] 
[Insert Table B.12 here] 
[Insert Table B.13 here] 
Table B.14 represents the results testing acquirers’ governance in non-diversifying acquisitions, 
from which we can see that the acquirers benefit the most from targets’ organizational capital when 
the merger is non-diversifying and when acquirers have better corporate governance. However, the 
coefficients of the continuous OC variable in the non-diversifying merger with low acquirer 
corporate governance become extremely insignificant (0.0006 with t-values of 0.177), which 
means when acquirers’ corporate governance is weak, even if it’s a non-diversifying merger, the 
acquirer still cannot benefit from targets’ organizational capital. 





In this paper, we examine whether targets’ organizational capital has a positive effect on acquirers’ 
post-merger abnormal returns. Using a perpetual inventory method, we calculate organizational 
capital from SG&A expenses and get a sample consisting of 1654 U.S. domestic M&A transactions. 
OLS regression results show that acquirers experience higher announcement abnormal returns 
when the targets have higher organizational capital, which means the market thinks that the 
acquirers can make use of the targets’ organizational capital by learning from the targets’ special 
processes and systems and etc. We also find that the positive relation between targets’ 
organizational capital and acquirers’ abnormal returns gets stronger and more significant when the 
acquirers and targets are in the same industry and when acquirers have better corporate governance.  
Future research is called for to examine whether there is a relation between corporate governance 
and organizational capital stock as well as how the organizational capital stock difference of 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
 
 
Variables Definition Source 
OC Cumulate SG&A expenses (adjusted by cpi) using 
perpetual inventory method 




dummy variable. Equals 1 if target OC is higher than 
sample median, otherwise equals 0 
Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 
acquirer OC Cumulate SG&A expenses (adjusted by cpi) using 
perpetual inventory method 
Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 




acquirer market value to book value of common 
equity 




acquirer (long-term debt+ debt in current 
liabilities)/asset 
Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 
acquirer roa acquirer EBIT/asset Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 
target size log (target asset) Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 
target mtob target market value to book value of common 
equity 




target (long-term debt+ debt in current 
liabilities)/asset 
Computed by author based on 
Compustat data 




deal value/acquirer market value. Market value 
is defined as the sum of market value of 
common stock, long-term debt, debt in current 
liabilities and liquidating value of preferred 
stock  
Computed by author based on 
Compustat data and SDC 
Platform data 
hostile dummy variable. Equals 1 if the merger is 
hostile; otherwise equals 0 
SDC Platform 
allcash dummy variable. Equals 1 if the payment is paid 
by cash; otherwise equals 0 
SDC Platform 
tender offer dummy variable. Equals 1 if the merger is a 
tender offer; otherwise equals 0 
SDC Platform 
diversifying dummy variable. Equals 1 if the acquirer and 




APENDIX B: TABLES 
Table B.1: Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
Year N CAR11 OC 
1984 10 0.0142 0.4051 
1985 45 -0.0133 0.0722 
1986 49 0.0065 0.3442 
1987 41 -0.0286 -0.2985 
1988 48 -0.0043 0.5505 
1989 30 -0.0237 0.2345 
1990 25 -0.0009 0.3489 
1991 25 -0.0485 0.5080 
1992 22 -0.0445 -0.1067 
1993 30 -0.0371 0.2419 
1994 59 -0.0030 0.0713 
1995 78 -0.0205 0.3703 
1996 81 -0.0141 0.0778 
1997 108 -0.0195 0.2021 
1998 132 -0.0352 0.1401 
1999 123 -0.0158 0.2066 
2000 90 -0.0232 0.2159 
2001 75 -0.0165 0.3977 
2002 51 -0.0010 0.4922 
2003 60 -0.0101 0.6480 
2004 64 -0.0450 0.4315 
2005 71 -0.0270 0.5161 
2006 60 -0.0213 0.1470 
2007 60 0.0015 0.2727 
2008 39 -0.0310 0.2644 
2009 45 -0.0249 0.5666 
2010 46 0.0001 0.3199 
2011 27 -0.0194 0.2201 
2012 35 0.0195 0.3119 
2013 25 0.0380 0.2790 
Total/Average 1654 -0.0171 0.2744 
This table represents the average of the key explained variable 
and explaining variable by year for a sample of US. domestic 
M&As from 1985 to 2013. OC refers to target organizational 
capital stock (scaled by asset less the industry median). The 
variables are estimated as of the fiscal year prior to the 








Table B.2: Statistical Properties of Key Variables 
Variables Mean STDEV Q1 Median Q3 N 
CAR11 -0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 1654 
OC 0.27 1.38 -0.56 -0.02 0.71 1654 
High OC Dummy 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1654 
acquirer OC -0.04 1.12 -0.69 -0.19 0.30 1654 
acquirer size 7.33 1.88 6.07 7.35 8.63 1654 
acquirer mtob 3.71 4.04 1.68 2.52 4.05 1654 
acquirer leverage 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.20 0.32 1654 
acquirer roa 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.15 1654 
target size 5.50 1.74 4.26 5.34 6.60 1654 
target mtob 3.08 4.02 1.29 2.00 3.30 1654 
target leverage 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.34 1654 
target roa 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.08 0.12 1654 
relative dealvalue 0.37 0.53 0.07 0.18 0.48 1654 
hostile 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1654 
allcash 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1654 
tender offer 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1654 
diversifying 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1654 
This table presents the statistical properties for the key variables used in this paper for the sample of 
US. domestic M&As from 1984 to 2013. OC refers to target organizational capital stock (scaled by 
asset less the industry median). The variables are estimated as of the fiscal year prior to the 


































































































































OC 0.08 1.00 0.34 -0.19 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 -0.25 0.05 -0.19 -0.20 -0.03 0.07 0.11 0.07 
acquirer OC 0.01 0.34 1.00 -0.19 0.07 -0.24 -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 
acquirer size 0.02 -0.19 -0.19 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.66 0.14 0.14 0.24 -0.30 0.00 0.19 0.06 
acquirer mtob -0.10 -0.01 0.07 0.02 1.00 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.19 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.12 
acquirer leverage 0.01 -0.15 -0.24 0.14 0.07 1.00 -0.01 0.21 -0.04 0.36 0.15 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 
acquirer roa -0.04 -0.07 -0.10 0.25 0.12 -0.01 1.00 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.35 -0.14 0.03 0.16 0.11 
target size -0.04 -0.25 -0.12 0.66 0.03 0.21 0.12 1.00 0.05 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.10 -0.07 -0.04 
target mtob -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.19 -0.04 0.04 0.05 1.00 0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 
target leverage 0.02 -0.19 -0.09 0.14 -0.09 0.36 -0.02 0.35 0.15 1.00 0.11 0.12 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 
target roa -0.02 -0.20 -0.14 0.24 -0.02 0.15 0.35 0.27 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
relative dealvalue -0.05 -0.03 0.09 -0.30 -0.03 0.09 -0.14 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.06 1.00 0.13 -0.20 -0.08 
hostile -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 1.00 0.12 0.23 
allcash 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.19 -0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.20 0.12 1.00 0.54 
tender offer 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.11 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.23 0.54 1.00 
diversifying 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11 
This table presents variable correlation coefficients for the sample of US. Domestic M&As from 1984 to 2013. OC refers to target organizational 
capital stock scaled by asset less the industry median. "Relative dealvalue" is the ratio of deal value of acquirer's market value. "Hostile", "allcash", 
"tender offer" and "diversifying" are dummy variables. The variables are estimated as of the fiscal year prior to the announcement day. 
 
Table B.4: Univiarate Test 
Dependent Variable Test Variable Mean STDEV N Difference (TSTAT) 
CAR11 
High OC -0.008308 0.112940 810 0.0173 
Low OC -0.025634 0.100156 844 3.2960 
This table represents univariate test on target organizational capital for a sample of US. domestic M&As from 1984 to 2013. The 
sample includes 1654 completed mergers. A firm is classified as high organizational capital firm if its OC >= sample median. The 




Table B.5: Main Regression 
Acquirer Announcement Returns and Target Organizational Capital Stock  
  (1) (2) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 
      
OC 0.0055**  
 (2.121) 
 
High OC Dummy  0.0138** 
  (2.479) 
acquirer OC -0.0009 -0.0002 
 (-0.329) (-0.058) 
acquirer size 0.0040 0.0037 
 (1.451) (1.342) 
acquirer mtob -0.0014 -0.0015 
 (-1.234) (-1.285) 
acquirer leverage 0.0040 0.0050 
 (0.175) (0.220) 
acquirer roa -0.0561 -0.0541 
 (-0.562) (-0.543) 
target size -0.0056** -0.0057** 
 (-2.039) (-2.057) 
target mtob -0.0019** -0.0018** 
 (-2.338) (-2.256) 
target leverage 0.0373* 0.0381** 
 (1.933) (1.984) 
target roa 0.0005 -0.0039 
 (0.020) (-0.170) 
relative dealvalue -0.0006 -0.0003 
 (-0.078) (-0.040) 
hostile -0.0169 -0.0144 
 (-1.570) (-1.344) 
allcash 0.0222*** 0.0229*** 
 (3.199) (3.345) 
tender offer 0.0182*** 0.0175*** 
 (2.869) (2.752) 
diversifying -0.0074 -0.0067 
 (-1.281) (-1.149) 
Constant -0.0161 -0.0206 
 (-0.737) (-0.939) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes 
  
 
Observations 1,654 1,654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.049 
This table shows the results of OLS regression of acquirer's CAR11 (11 days of cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement day) on OC (target's organizational capital stock) 
and High OC Dummy. OC is scaled by asset and adjusted for industry level, thus it is a 
percentage of book aseet. High OC Dummy is the part of sample which is higher than median 
of OC of the sample.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   




Table B.6: Robustness Test 1 
Acquirer CAR3 and CAR5 and Target Organizational Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CAR3 CAR5 CAR3 CAR5 
         
OC 0.0024 0.0039**   
 (1.642) (2.238)   
High OC Dummy   0.0088** 0.0109** 
   (2.257) (2.525) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0153 -0.0223 -0.0194 -0.0264 
 (-1.223) (-1.355) (-1.541) (-1.601) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.079 0.066 0.081 0.066 
This table shows the robustness test results using acquirer CAR3 and CAR5. CAR3 is CAR (-1, +1), which 
is 3-days cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day. CAR5 is CAR (-2, +2), which is 5-
days cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day. All else are the same with the main 
regression. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table B.7: Robustness Test 2 
Acquirer BHAR3, BHAR5, BHAR11 and Target Organizational Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables BHAR3 BHAR5 BHAR11 BHAR3 BHAR5 BHAR11 
              
OC 0.0023 0.0037** 0.0056**    
 (1.626) (2.235) (2.077)    
High OC Dummy    0.0092** 0.0109** 0.0141** 
    (2.346) (2.525) (2.552) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0157 -0.0230 -0.0167 -0.0201 -0.0273 -0.0214 
 (-1.253) (-1.372) (-0.748) (-1.597) (-1.632) (-0.953) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081 0.068 0.051 0.082 0.069 0.051 
This table shows the robustness test results using acquirer BHAR3, BHAR5 and BHAR11. BHAR3 (BHAR5 
and BHAR11) is acquirer buy and hold abnormal 3 (5 and 11) days returns around announcement day.   All 
else are the same with the main regression. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses      





















Table B.8: Robustness Test 3 
Acquirer CAR11 and Different Depreciation rates of Target Organizational Capital 
 delta=5% delta=10% delta=15% delta=20% delta=25% delta=30% delta=35% delta=40% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 







































  (2.644)  (2.487)  (2.479)  (2.595)  (2.593)  (2.647)  (2.646)  (2.645) 
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0161 -0.0215 -0.0160 -0.0206 -0.0161 -0.0206 -0.0161 -0.0212 -0.0161 -0.0212 -0.0161 -0.0215 -0.0161 -0.0215 -0.0161 -0.0215 
 (-0.740) (-0.979) (-0.736) (-0.940) (-0.737) (-0.939) (-0.737) (-0.967) (-0.737) (-0.967) (-0.739) (-0.979) (-0.739) (-0.979) (-0.739) (-0.979) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster(Acquire
r) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                 
Observations 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 1,654 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 
This Table presents the robustness test results of different depreciation rates of target organizational capital. Results show that our model stays significant when the depreciation rate of organizational capital is between 5% to 40%. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1                
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Table B.9: Subsample Test 1 
Whether Diversifying Merger Matters to Target Organizational Capital’s Effect on Acquirer CAR11 
 Non-diversifying Diversifying 
  (1) (2) (3)      (4) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 
          
OC 0.0044*  0.0045  
 (1.808)  (0.863)  
High OC Dummy  0.0179**  0.0003 
  (2.533)  (0.030) 
acquirer OC -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0006 
 (-0.202) (-0.239) (-0.360) (-0.095) 
acquirer size 0.0065* 0.0061* 0.0016 0.0012 
 (1.928) (1.789) (0.359) (0.268) 
acquirer mtob -0.0027** -0.0027** 0.0026 0.0026 
 (-2.250) (-2.282) (0.980) (0.957) 
acquirer leverage -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0137 0.0176 
 (-0.067) (-0.017) (0.350) (0.464) 
acquirer roa -0.0865 -0.0842 0.0516 0.0568 
 (-0.700) (-0.682) (0.823) (0.899) 
target size -0.0078** -0.0074** -0.0035 -0.0040 
 (-2.193) (-2.067) (-0.703) (-0.814) 
target mtob -0.0016* -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0014 
 (-1.663) (-1.590) (-1.121) (-0.981) 
target leverage 0.0365 0.0399 0.0056 0.0031 
 (1.486) (1.600) (0.208) (0.118) 
target roa 0.0098 0.0072 -0.0264 -0.0356 
 (0.379) (0.277) (-0.726) (-0.983) 
relative dealvalue 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0066 -0.0071 
 (0.029) (0.073) (-0.405) (-0.429) 
Hostile -0.0218 -0.0201 -0.0059 -0.0025 
 (-1.365) (-1.251) (-0.336) (-0.140) 
allcash 0.0274*** 0.0277*** 0.0059 0.0071 
 (3.246) (3.308) (0.525) (0.636) 
tender offer 0.0220*** 0.0211*** 0.0080 0.0079 
 (2.744) (2.630) (0.730) (0.716) 
Constant -0.0286 -0.0360 -0.0120 -0.0052 
 (-1.259) (-1.573) (-0.283) (-0.118) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,113 1,113 541 541 
Adjusted R-squared 0.084 0.087 0.013 0.010 
This table shows the results of testing hypothesis 2 on two subsamples: Non-diversifying mergers and 
Diversifying mergers. A merger is defined as a diversifying merger when the target and acquirer are from 
different industries. We have 1113 non-diversifying mergers and 541 diversifying mergers in our sample. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.10: Subsample Test 2 
Whether Diversifying Merger Matters to Target Organizational Capital’s Effect on 
Acquirer CAR11 
  (1) (2) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 
      
OC 0.0050**  
 (2.097) 
 
High OC Dummy  0.0119* 
  (1.847) 
acquirer OC -0.0009 -0.0003 
 (-0.321) (-0.123) 
acquirer size 0.0040 0.0038 
 (1.469) (1.401) 
acquirer mtob -0.0014 -0.0015 
 (-1.247) (-1.287) 
acquirer leverage 0.0037 0.0041 
 (0.161) (0.180) 
acquirer roa -0.0564 -0.0550 
 (-0.564) (-0.552) 
target size -0.0056** -0.0057** 
 (-2.042) (-2.057) 
target mtob -0.0019** -0.0018** 
 (-2.324) (-2.246) 
target leverage 0.0371* 0.0377** 
 (1.943) (1.978) 
target roa 0.0010 -0.0016 
 (0.046) (-0.070) 
relative dealvalue -0.0006 -0.0003 
 (-0.076) (-0.039) 
hostile -0.0171 -0.0155 
 (-1.581) (-1.430) 
allcash 0.0222*** 0.0228*** 
 (3.201) (3.302) 
tender offer 0.0182*** 0.0177*** 
 (2.874) (2.775) 
diversifying -0.0078 -0.0077 
 (-1.387) (-1.369) 
diversify_oc 0.0013 0.0032 
 (0.232) (0.522) 
Constant -0.0162 -0.0207 
 (-0.746) (-0.948) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes 
  
 
Observations 1,654 1,654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.049 
This table shows the results of OLS regression of acquirer's CAR11 (11 days of cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement day) on OC (target's organizational capital stock) 
and High OC Dummy, with a control variable "diversify_oc", which is the interaction variable 
of "diversifying" and OC. OC is scaled by asset and adjusted for industry level. High OC 
Dummy is the part of sample which is higher than median of OC of the sample.  
Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses   




Table B.11: Subsample Test 3a 
 High_ownership Low_ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 
          
OC 0.0079***  0.0044  
 (2.689)  (1.165)  
High OC Dummy  0.0153**  0.0141 
  (2.246)  (1.507) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0754 -0.0793 -0.0106 -0.0159 
 (-1.245) (-1.324) (-0.408) (-0.604) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 827 827 827 827 
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.094 0.032 0.032 
This table shows whether corporate governance plays an important role in acquirers' utilizing of the targets' organizational 
capital. We use total institutional ownership as a proxy for corporate governance. The merger is classified into the 
"High_Ownership" group if the acquirer's total institutional ownership is higher than the sample median, otherwise it is 
in the "Low_Ownership" group. There are 827 acquisitions in which the acquirers are considered with high institutional 
ownership (corporate governance) and 827 acquisitions in which acquirers are considered with low institutional 
ownership.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table B.12: Subsample Test 3b 
 Low_Gindex High_Gindex 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 
          
OC 0.0076*  0.0041  
 (1.715)  (0.935)  
High OC Dummy  0.0254**  0.0086 
  (2.405)  (1.043) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0453 -0.0563 0.0069 0.0040 
 (-1.190) (-1.522) (0.216) (0.124) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 382 382 423 423 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.068 0.090 0.091 
This table shows whether corporate governance plays an important role in acquirers' utilizing of the targets' organizational 
capital. We use total institutional ownership as a proxy for corporate governance. The merger is classified into the 
"High_Gindex" (low corporate governance) group if the acquirer's G_index is higher than the sample median, otherwise 
it is in the "Low_Gindex" (high corporate governance) group. There are 423 acquisitions in which the acquirers are 
considered with low governance and 382 acquisitions in which acquirers are considered with high governance.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    




Table B.13: Subsample Test 3c 
 Low_Eindex High_Gindex 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 
         
OC 0.0137**  -0.0027  
 (2.288)  (-0.357)  
High OC Dummy  0.0372***  -0.0073 
  (2.792)  (-0.527) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0575 -0.0666 0.0621 0.0664 
 (-1.317) (-1.574) (0.908) (0.977) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 210 210 147 147 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.222 0.092 0.094 
This table shows whether corporate governance plays an important role in acquirers' utilizing of the targets' 
organizational capital. We use E_index as a proxy for corporate governance. The merger is classified into the 
"High_Eindex" (low corporate governance) group if the acquirer's E_index is higher than the sample median, 
otherwise it is in the "Low_Eindex" (high corporate governance) group. There are 147 acquisitions in which the 
acquirers are considered with low governance and 210 acquisitions in which acquirers are considered with high 
governance. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table B.14: Subsample Test 3d 
 High_ownership Low_ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 CAR11 
          
OC 0.0096**  0.0006  
 (2.562)  (0.177)  
High OC Dummy  0.0186**  0.0180 
  (1.990)  (1.545) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0114 -0.0183 -0.0377 -0.0479* 
 (-0.351) (-0.552) (-1.363) (-1.684) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Acquirer) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 568 568 545 545 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.118 0.090 0.094 
This table shows whether corporate governance plays an important role in acquirers' utilizing of the targets' 
organizational capital. We use total institutional ownership as a proxy for corporate governance. Among the non-
diversifying acquisitions, the merger is classified into the "High_Ownership" group if the acquirer's total 
institutional ownership is higher than the sample median, otherwise it is in the "Low_Ownership" group. There are 
568 non-diversifying acquisitions in which the acquirers are considered with high institutional ownership 
(corporate governance) and 545 non-diversifying acquisitions in which acquirers are considered with low 
institutional ownership.  
Robust t-statistics in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
